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1 Introduction
Over the past twenty years, many researchers, such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (1997), Aghion, et al. (1999), and Aghion, et al. (2004), have emphasized
the importance of financial market imperfections as a fundamental cause of business cycles.
Among those researchers, Woodford (1986) focuses on the interactive relationship between
two distinct classes of agents, capitalists and workers, in a financially constrained economy
and clarifies a mechanism that creates business cycles.1 He assumes that capitalists and
workers diﬀer in their income resources and their accessibility to credit and shows that en-
dogenous business cycles driven by self-filling rational expectations can emerge.2 Along the
same lines as Woodford (1986), the present paper investigates the macroeconomic impli-
cations for business cycles of the existence of two distinct classes of agents by developing
a dynamic general equilibrium model with capital accumulation. In contrast to Woodford
(1986), who assumes an economy where the class of capitalists is separated from the class of
workers in the financial market, we investigate how endogenous business cycles arise in an
economy where the class of entrepreneurs interacts with the class of financiers through the
financial market.
Our model is closely related to a pioneering work by Takalo and Toivanen (2012), who
develop a formal model that distinguishes the role of financiers from that of entrepreneurs.
They focus on entrepreneurial finance and develop a model in which borrowing entrepreneurs
and lending entrepreneurs endogenously appear in equilibrium. However, because their
model is static in nature, the model cannot be applied to business cycle problems. In
contrast, the model developed in this paper is a dynamic general equilibrium model; thus,
we can study the possibilities of endogenous business cycles.
In our model, agents who have inherent entrepreneurial talents are called entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs are able to access a production technology. However, because they receive
uninsured idiosyncratic productivity shocks, only highly productive entrepreneurs engage
in production in each time period, borrowing financial resources in the financial market at
an interest rate lower than their productivity. Less productive entrepreneurs lend their net
1The research on the macroeconomic implications for business cycles of two distinct classes in an economy
dates back to Kalecki (1937).
2See also Woodford (1988a,b).
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worth in the financial market at an interest rate greater than their productivity. In other
words, borrowing entrepreneurs and lending entrepreneurs endogenously arise in each time
period in a similar way to that of Takalo and Toivanen (2012), depending on their received
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Moreover, financiers in our model are assumed to have no
inherent entrepreneurial talents. Instead, they lend their net worth in the financial market.
There are three types of agents in the economy in each time. The first type is entrepreneurs
who engage in production, and the second type is entrepreneurs who lend their net worth in
the financial market. The third type is financiers who have no entrepreneurial talents but lend
their net worth in the financial market. Unlike Takalo and Toivanen (2012), less productive
entrepreneurs lending their net worth in the financial market are not called financiers in our
model. Instead, agents who have no inherent entrepreneurial talents are called financiers.
Although entrepreneurs who engage in production borrow in the financial market in
equilibrium, they face credit constraints. In such a situation, the entrepreneurs who engage in
production are not always the “most” productive but the “highly” productive entrepreneurs,
implying that production resources are not used in the most eﬃcient way in each time period.
Under these circumstances, the existence of financiers has a two-fold importance, given a
certain extent of financial market imperfections. The highest growth rate is achievable in
a financially constrained economy only if financiers coexist with entrepreneurs. However,
if financiers coexist with entrepreneurs, the economy is highly likely to exhibit endogenous
business cycles and go into a financial crisis followed by a severe economic depression. That
is, provided that the financial market is imperfect in an economy, the existence of financiers
contributes to a boost in the growth rate, and, at the same time, the existence of financiers
involves a potential peril such that an economy is led to a collapse.
A remarkable characteristic of modern capitalism is the coexistence of entrepreneurs and
financiers. As historically observed, financial markets evolve in the process of economic de-
velopment.3 The evolution of financial markets yields the class of financiers. As a result,
an economy is able to use tremendous financial resources supplied by financiers to complete
large investment projects that are otherwise impossible. Financiers lend their net worth to
entrepreneurs to propagate their wealth in a financial market and do not engage in produc-
3Levine (2005) provides a comprehensive review of research on finance and growth.
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tion. Alternately, entrepreneurs, who trust their own entrepreneurial talents, raise funds
in the financial markets and invest in projects that produce added values if the investment
projects succeed, taking risks involving the investment. Even in an economy with an es-
tablished financial market, generic agency problems remain and, accordingly, the financial
resources are not used in the most eﬃcient way. We model these situations.
In our model, allocative ineﬃciency has a significant implication for business cycle phe-
nomena. The ineﬃcient use of financial resources and propagated net worth of financiers
induce a decrease in the return on financial resources during an economic boom. For some
parameter values, a return on financial resources steeply falls at some point in time and a
severe depression follows.
To investigate endogenous business cycles, we employ a model of infinitely lived agents.
Endogenous business cycles have long been studied by many researchers, using models of
infinitely lived agents.4 Benhabib and Nishimura (1985), who are pioneers of the literature
on endogenous business cycles, develop a model of an infinitely lived representative agent
with two production sectors and derive suﬃcient conditions for the economy to exhibit
deterministic endogenous business cycles. Boldrin and Denecker (1990) also develop a two-
sector dynamic general equilibrium model with specific production technology and agent
preferences. They demonstrate that the economy exhibits deterministic endogenous business
cycles and even chaotic equilibria for some parameter values. Nishimura and Yano (1995)
provide a simple example of a model with capital accumulation in which an economy exhibits
ergodically chaotic dynamics. Although these studies demonstrate that deterministic cycles
appear in equilibrium, there is no friction in the markets in their models.5 In contrast, there
is financial friction in our model. Although we employ a Ramsey-type of growth model
with one production sector, due to financial market imperfections, deterministic endogenous
business cycles arise in equilibrium in our model.6
4Endogenous business cycles also have been studied with overlapping generations models. For instance,
Farmer (1986), Reichlin (1986), Benhabib and Laroque (1988), Kitagawa and Shibata (2001), and Rochon
and Polemarchakis (2006) derive competitive equilibrium cycles in overlapping generations economies with
production sectors.
5Endogenous business cycles are also induced by self-fulfilling rational expectations as sunspot equilibria.
For sunspot equilibria in growth models of infinitely lived agents, see Woodford (1986), Benhabib and Farmer
(1994, 1996), Boldrin and Rustichini (1994), and Gali (1994), among others.
6Futagami and Mino (1993) also develop a Ramsey-type of a one-sector growth model with threshold
production externalities, and they derive deterministic cycles.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a
growth model in which there are two classes of agents: entrepreneurs and financiers. In
section 3, we investigate the equilibrium growth rates and the local and global stabilities of
the economy. In section 4, we discuss a financial crisis and in section 5, we present concluding
remarks.
2 Model
The economy consists of two classes: one unit measure of infinitely lived entrepreneurs
and one unit measure of infinitely lived financiers. Time is discrete and goes from 0 to
∞. Entrepreneurs are ex-ante homogeneous and ex-post heterogeneous because they receive
idiosyncratic productivity shocks in each time period. No financiers engage in production
because they have no inherent entrepreneurial talents. Instead, financiers lend their net
worth in the financial market to obtain their income in each time period.
2.1 Entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur has two types of saving methods. One is lending her net worth in the
financial market. If she lends one unit of general goods in the financial market at time t− 1,
she will acquire a claim to rt units of general goods at time t where rt is the (gross) real
interest rate. The other saving method is starting an investment project. If an entrepreneur
invests one unit of general goods in an investment project at time t−1, she will create AΦt−1
units of general goods at time t. An idiosyncratic shock Φt−1 with respect to productivity
at time t is realized at time t− 1, which implies that production takes one gestation period.
Accordingly, an entrepreneur at time t − 1 already knows her productivity at time t. Low
productivity cannot be insured because no insurance market exists for the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. If an entrepreneur wants to borrow financial resources in the financial
market, she faces a credit constraint due to an agency problem in the financial market. In
each period, entrepreneurs consume, lend their net worth, and/or invest in projects borrowing
financial resources in the financial market.
The productivity Φt−1 is a random variable, implying that it is a function of a stochastic
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event ωt−1, where {ωt−1 ∈ Ω | Φt−1(ωt−1) ≤ Φ} is an element of a σ-algebra F of a probability
space (Ω,F , P ). As in Angeletos (2007), the stochastic events ω0,ω1, ... (and the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks Φ0(ω0),Φ1(ω1), ...) are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed across both time and agents (the i.i.d. assumption). Φ has support over [0, h],
where h > 0 is finite. Φ’s cumulative distribution function is given by G(Φ), where G(Φ) is
continuous, diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing on the support.
We define the histories of stochastic events and the idiosyncratic productivity shocks
until time t− 1 such that ωt−1 = {ω0,ω1, ...ωt−1} and Φt−1 = {Φ0,Φ1, ...Φt−1}. Then, there
exists a probability space (Ωt,F t, P t), which is a Cartesian product of t copies of (Ω,F , P ),
where Φt−1(ωt−1) is a vector function of the history ωt−1∈ Ωt.
An entrepreneur at time t maximizes her expected lifetime utility given by:
U et = E
" ∞X
τ=t
βτ−te ln cτ (ωτ )
¯¯¯
Φt(ωt)
#
,
subject to:
kτ (ωτ ) + bτ (ωτ ) = AΦτ−1(ωτ−1)kτ−1(ωτ−1) + rτbτ−1(ωτ−1)− cτ (ωτ ) (1)
bτ (ωτ ) ≥ −θaτ (ωτ ) (2)
kτ (ωτ ) ≥ 0, (3)
for τ ≥ t ≥ 0, where βe ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, which is common to all
entrepreneurs, and E[.|Φt] is an expectation operator given an information set associated
with Φt at time t. Eq.(1) is the flow budget constraints, where cτ (ωτ ) is consumption,
kτ (ωτ ) denotes investment in a project, and bτ (ωτ ) is a debt if negative and credit if positive
at time τ . AΦτ−1(ωτ−1)kτ−1(ωτ−1) is the general goods produced by the entrepreneur at
time τ . We assume that the general goods are perishable in one period, and thus, kτ (ωτ )
depreciates entirely in one period. aτ (ωτ ) := kτ (ωτ )+ bτ (ωτ ) is the entrepreneur’s net worth
and rτ is the gross interest rate at time τ . Note that aτ (ωτ ) is equal to her saving because
aτ (ωτ ) = AΦτ−1kτ−1(ωτ−1) + rτbτ−1(ωτ−1) − cτ (ωτ ). We assume that at t = 0, the flow
budget constraint is given by k0+ b0 = w0− c0, where w0 is the initial endowment that each
entrepreneur holds at birth, which is common to all entrepreneurs.
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If an entrepreneur borrows financial resources in the financial market, she faces a credit
constraint due to an agency problem in the financial market. The credit constraint facing
each entrepreneur is given by Eq.(2). As in Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005),
Aghion et al. (2005), or Antra´s and Caballero (2009), an entrepreneur is able to borrow
financial resources in the financial market only up to θ times her net worth.7 θ ∈ (0,∞)
represents the extent of credit constraints where, as θ goes to infinity, the financial market
approaches perfection. Finally, Eq.(3) is the non-negativity constraint of investment.
Define φt := rt+1/A. From the maximization problem of an entrepreneur, it is optimal for
entrepreneurs with Φt > φt to invest in a project, borrow financial resources up to the limit
of the credit constraint, and engage in general goods production. Meanwhile, it is optimal
for entrepreneurs with Φt < φt to lend their net worth in the financial market and obtain
the (gross) interest rate rt+1. Note that φt is a cutoﬀ of idiosyncratic productivity shocks
that divides entrepreneurs into lenders and borrowers at time t. As a result, we obtain a
lending-investment-borrowing plan for an entrepreneur who has net worth at(ωt) at time t
as follows:
kt(ωt) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if Φt(ωt) < φt
at(ωt)
1−μ if Φt(ωt) > φt,
(4)
and
bt(ωt) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
at(ωt) if Φt(ωt) < φt
− μ
1−μat(ωt) if Φt(ωt) > φt,
(5)
where μ := θ/(1 + θ) ∈ (0, 1) also measures the extent of credit constraints. Under this
lending-investment-borrowing plan, the flow budget constraint at time τ can be rewritten as
an intensive form such that:
aτ (ωτ ) = R˜τaτ−1(ωτ−1)− cτ (ωτ ), (6)
where R˜τ := max{rτ , AΦτ−1−rτμ1−μ }. We provide a derivation of the budget constraint Eq.(6)
in the Appendix. Given the lending-investment-borrowing plan given by Eqs.(4) and (5),
an entrepreneur at time t maximizes her lifetime utility U et subject to Eq.(6). The Euler
7We present two types of microfoundations for the credit constraint in the Appendix.
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equation is given by:
1
ct(ωt) = βeE
∙
R˜t+1
1
ct+1(ωt+1)
¯¯Φt(ωt)¸ . (7)
The lifetime utility function is log-linear, so from Eqs.(6), (7) and the transversality condi-
tion, we obtain lemma 1:
Lemma 1 The law of motion of an entrepreneur’s net worth at(ωt) is given by:
at+1(ωt+1) = βeR˜t+1at(ωt). (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.2 Financiers
Financiers never engage in general goods production because they inherently have no en-
trepreneurial talents; Financiers acquire income by lending their net worth in the financial
market. Each financier is endowed with an initial net worth W0 > 0 at birth.
A representative financier at time t maximizes her lifetime utility as:
U ct =
∞X
τ=t
βτ−tc ln cτ ,
subject to:
Wτ = rτWτ−1 − cτ (9)
for τ ≥ t ≥ 0, whereWτ is her net worth carried over from time τ to time τ+1 and βc ∈ (0, 1)
is the subjective discount factor. We assume that W0 > 0. Obtaining the Euler equation is
straightforward:
1
ct
= βcrt+1 1
ct+1
(10)
Similar to the case of entrepreneurs, from Eqs.(9) and (10) and the transversality condition,
we obtain the law of motion of a representative financier’s net worth in lemma 2:
Lemma 2 The law of motion of a representative financier’s net worth Wt is given by:
Wt+1 = βcrt+1Wt. (11)
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Proof. The proof is omitted because it is essentially the same as in lemma 1. ¤
2.3 Aggregation
We assume that the law of large numbers can be applied to entrepreneurs. Because at(ωt) =
βeR˜tat−1(ωt−1) from Eq.(8), the net worth at(ωt) of an entrepreneur who receives a stochastic
event ωt at time t and has a history ωt−1 is presented by:
at(ωt) = βe(AΦt−1(ωt−1)kt−1(ωt−1) + rtbt−1(ωt−1)), (12)
where we should note from Eqs.(4) and (5) that for an entrepreneur with Φt−1(ωt−1) <
φt−1, it follows that kt−1(ωt−1) = 0 and bt−1(ωt−1) = at−1(ωt−1). For an entrepreneur
with Φt−1(ωt−1) > φt−1, it follows that kt−1(ωt−1) = at−1(ωt−1)/(1 − μ) and bt−1(ωt−1) =
−μat−1(ωt−1)/(1 − μ). The stochastic event ωt and the history ωt−1 are independent from
each other. Therefore, applying the law of large numbers to entrepreneurs, we aggregate the
net worth of the entrepreneurs with the stochastic realization ωt as follows:
a˜t(ωt) :=
Z
Ωt
at(ωt)dP t(ωt−1) = βe
Z
Ωt
(AΦt−1(ωt−1)kt−1(ωt−1) + rtbt−1(ωt−1))dP t(ωt−1), (13)
where we should note that ωt−1 is an element of Ωt. From the financial market clearing
condition at time t− 1, we have:
Wt−1 +
Z
Ωt
bt−1(ωt−1)dP t(ωt−1) = 0.
The aggregate output at time t is given by:
Yt :=
Z
Ωt
AΦt−1(ωt−1)kt−1(ωt−1)dP t(ωt−1).
Therefore, Eq.(13) is rewritten as:
a˜t(ωt) = βe(Yt − rtWt−1). (14)
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Eq.(14) is the aggregate net worth over entrepreneurs who receive a stochastic event ωt at
time t. In some sense, Eq.(14) expresses a distribution of net worth in an economy with
respect to ωt, although the distribution is uniform over ωt. Note that Eq.(14) is eﬀective for
t ≥ 1. For t = 0, it follows that a˜0(ω0) = βew0.
As clarified in Eqs.(4) and (5), entrepreneurs with a stochastic event ωt such that Φt(ωt) >
φt become producers at time t, whereas entrepreneurs with a stochastic event ωt such that
Φt(ωt) < φt become lenders. Therefore, from Eqs.(4) and (5), the aggregate debt or credit
b˜t(ωt) across the entrepreneurs with stochastic realization ωt is presented by:
b˜t(ωt) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
a˜t(ωt) = βe(Yt − rtWt−1) if Φt(ωt) < φt
− μ
1−μ a˜t(ωt) = − μβe1−μ(Yt − rtWt−1) if Φt(ωt) > φt.
(15)
Similarly, the aggregate investment k˜t(ωt) across the entrepreneurs with stochastic realization
ωt is given by:
k˜t(ωt) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if Φt(ωt) < φt
1
1−μ a˜t(ωt) = βe1−μ(Yt − rtWt−1) if Φt(ωt) > φt.
(16)
From the financial-market clearing condition, we have:
Wt = −
Z
E
b˜t(ωt)dP (ωt)−
Z
Ω/E
b˜t(ωt)dP (ωt)
= −βe(Yt − rtWt−1)G(φt)− μ
1− μ , (17)
where E = {ωt ∈ Ω | Φt(ωt) ≤ φt}. Multiplying AΦt(ωt) on both sides of the second
equation of (16) and aggregating the resulting equation across all entrepreneurs who engage
in production, we obtain the total output Yt+1 as follows:
Z
Ω/E
AΦt(ωt)k˜t(ωt)dP (ωt) =
Z
Ω/E
βeAΦt(ωt)
1− μ (Yt − rtWt−1)dP (ωt)
⇐⇒ Yt+1 =
βeAF (φt)
1− μ (Yt − rtWt−1) (18)
where F (φt) := R∞φt Φt(ωt)dG(Φt).
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3 Equilibrium Dynamics
3.1 Equilibrium
Defining B := βe/βc, we derive, from Eqs.(11), (17), and (18), the dynamic equations for
t ≥ 1 with respect to the cutoﬀ φt and the growth rate of the aggregate output Γt+1(φt) :=
Yt+1/Yt, respectively, as follows:
B(G(φt)− μ)
1− μ−B(G(φt)− μ) =
φt−1(G(φt−1)− μ)
F (φt−1) (19)
and
Γt+1(φt) = βcABF (φt)
1− μ−B(G(φt)− μ) . (20)
The net worth of the representative financier becomes:
Wt = Aβcφt−1Wt−1 (21)
because rt = Aφt−1.
φ0 = r1/A is a predetermined variable. To see this predetermination, we consider Eq.(17),
which is eﬀective for t ≥ 1. Because we have a˜0(ω0) = βew0 for t = 0, Eq.(17) is modified for
t = 0 such that W0 = −βew0(G(φ0) − μ)/(1 − μ). Because W0 and w0 are predetermined,
φ0 = r1/A is also predetermined.8 In other words, φ0 or r1 is determined such that the
financial market clears at time t = 0.
In a competitive equilibrium, the economy is recursively expressed by sequences {Wt,φt, Yt+1},
such that for all t ≥ 1, these three sequences satisfy the diﬀerence equations (19), (20) and
(21), given W0, φ0, and Y1, where Y1 = βeAF (φ0)w0/(1− μ).
The dynamic behavior of φt associated with Eq.(19) provides information about both
the dynamic behavior of Wt and the equilibrium growth rates of Yt from Eqs.(20) and (21).
Therefore, we intensively analyze Eq.(19) in what follows.
8For G(φ0) to be well-defined, it must follow that μ− (1− μ)W0/(βew0) > 0. We assume this parameter
condition.
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3.2 Steady states
We find from lemma 2 that Wt ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, which implies that G(φt) ≤ μ for all t ≥ 0
from Eq.(17) because Yt − rtWt−1 > 0 in equilibrium.9 Therefore, we restrict the domain of
the dynamical system (19) to [0, G−1(μ)].
There are at most two steady states in the dynamical system (19). To examine the
existence of the steady states in the dynamical system (19), we define φ∗ and φ∗∗ such that:
G(φ∗) = μ
1−μ
B
= F (φ
∗∗)
φ∗∗ + (G(φ∗∗)− μ).
A unique value of φ∗ must exist because G(.) is a strictly increasing function over the
support of Φ. To investigate the uniqueness of φ∗∗, we define a function such that H(x) :=
F (x)/x + (G(x) − μ). H(x) is strictly decreasing in (0, h) because H 0(x) = −F (x)/x2 < 0
in (0, h). In addition, limx→0H(x) =∞ and limx→hH(x) = 1− μ. Because φ∗∗ is a solution
of H(x) = (1 − μ)/B, φ∗∗ is uniquely determined in (0, h] if and only if B ≤ 1. φ∗ and φ∗∗
can be solved in terms of the parameters of μ and B and the parameters of the distribution
of Φ such that φ∗(μ;Θ) and φ∗∗(μ, B;Θ), where Θ is the parameter set of the distribution
of Φ; however, we write φ∗ and φ∗∗ to save notations.
Because the domain of the dynamical system (19) is [0,φ∗], the system has a steady-state
equilibrium φ∗∗ in addition to φ∗ if and only if φ∗∗ < φ∗. Because H(x) = F (x)/x+(G(x)−μ)
is a strictly decreasing function, the condition for φ∗∗ < φ∗ is equivalent to (1−μ)/B > H(φ∗).
In what follows, to focus our study on interesting cases, we assume this inequality. The
inequality (1− μ)/B > H(φ∗) is rewritten as in Eq.(22) in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1
B <
φ∗(1−G(φ∗))
F (φ∗) =: B
∗. (22)
Assumption 1 guarantees the existence of two steady-state equilibria in the dynamical
system (19). Note that because F (φ∗) = R hφ∗ ΦdG(Φ) > R hφ∗ φ∗dG(Φ) = φ∗(1 − G(φ∗)),
Assumption 1 leads to B = βe/βc < 1. This finding implies that the subjective discount
9Otherwise, Yt+1 becomes negative in Eq.(18).
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factor of entrepreneurs is strictly less than that of financiers. In other words, to obtain two
steady-state equilibria, financiers need to be more patient than entrepreneurs.
We conclude this subsection with two remarks on the steady states in the economy. First,
if μ is arbitrarily close to zero, φ∗∗ does not exist because the domain of the dynamical system
[0, G−1(μ)] shrinks to the origin. In this case, there is no financial market and financiers are
unable to exist because it is impossible for them to lend their net worth in the financial
market. Second, if μ is arbitrarily close to one, φ∗∗ and φ∗ coincide with each other and
are equal to h. This can be verified from the definition of φ∗ and φ∗∗. If μ is arbitrarily
close to one, G(φ∗) = 1 holds and thus φ∗ = h. Likewise, if μ is arbitrarily close to one,
F (φ∗∗) = φ∗(1 −G(φ∗∗)) holds. This equation holds if and only if φ∗∗ = h. In this case, all
production recourses, including financiers’ resources, are intensively and eﬃciently used by
the most talented entrepreneurs.
3.3 Growth rates
The growth rate Γt+1 for t ≥ 1 in Eq.(20) is a function of φt. In this section, we demonstrate
that the steady state φ∗∗ provides the highest growth rate in the economy.
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, given the parameter values of βe,
βc, and μ and the parameter values of the distribution G(Φ), the growth rate in the steady
state φ∗∗ is the highest for any φt ∈ [0, G−1(μ)].
Proposition 1 is shown below. Diﬀerentiating Γt+1 with respect to φt, we have:
Γ0t+1(φt) = J(φt) βcABG
0(φt)
[1− μ−B(G(φt)− μ)]2 ,
where J(φt) := BF (φt) − φt[1 − μ − B(G(φt) − μ)]. It can be easily verified that J(φt)
is strictly decreasing and that J(φ∗∗) = 0. Therefore, Γ0t+1 is strictly greater than zero if
0 < φt < φ∗∗ and it is strictly less than zero if φt > φ∗∗. Therefore, the maximum of Γt+1 is
achieved at φt = φ∗∗.
We find from Proposition 1 that the existence of financiers has an important meaning
for the economy. Suppose that there are no financiers in this economy. In this case, Wt = 0
for all t ≥ 0 and we only have the steady state φ∗ = G−1(μ). This implies that without
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financiers, the economy can never attain the highest growth rate, given a certain extent of
financial market imperfections. In turn, with the infinitesimal initial net worth W0 > 0 of
financiers, the highest growth rate is achievable for some parameter values. The existence of
financiers is necessary for the highest growth rate to be achieved provided that the financial
market is imperfect.
3.4 Local stability
We investigate the local stability around the steady states of the dynamical system (19). Let
us define two functions as Ψ(φt) := B(G(φt)−μ)1−μ−B(G(φt)−μ) , which is the left-hand side of Eq.(19), and
Λ(φt−1) := φt−1(G(φt−1)−μ)F (φt−1) , which is the right-hand side. Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) are, respectively,
approximated around the steady state of φ∗ as follows:
Ψ(φt) ≈ BG
0(φ∗)
1−G(φ∗)(φt − φ
∗)
and
Λ(φt−1) ≈ φ
∗G0(φ∗)
F (φ∗) (φt−1 − φ
∗).
From these approximations, we obtain the local dynamical system around the steady state
of φ∗ as follows:
φt − φ∗ = φ
∗(1−G(φ∗))
BF (φ∗) (φt−1 − φ
∗). (23)
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the steady state of φ∗ is locally
unstable.
Proof. It follows from Assumption 1 that [φ∗(1−G(φ∗))]/BF (φ∗) > 1. ¤
On the other hand, Ψ(φt) and Λ(φt−1) are, respectively, approximated around the steady
state of φ∗∗ as follows:
Ψ(φt) ≈ φ
∗∗G0(φ∗∗)F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ)
F (φ∗∗)2 (φt − φ
∗∗)
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and
Λ(φt−1) ≈ [(G(φ
∗∗)− μ) + φ∗∗G0(φ∗∗)]F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ)
F (φ∗∗)2 (φt−1 − φ
∗∗).
Therefore, the local dynamical system around the steady state of φ∗∗ is given by
φt − φ∗∗ =
h (G(φ∗∗)− μ)F (φ∗∗)
φ∗∗G0(φ∗∗)F (φ∗∗) + (φ∗∗)2G0(φ∗∗)(G(φ∗∗)− μ) + 1
i
(φt−1 − φ∗∗).
Because φ∗∗ satisfies (1− μ)/B = F (φ∗∗)/φ∗∗ + (G(φ∗∗)− μ), this equation is rewritten as:
φt − φ∗∗ =
h(G(φ∗∗)− μ)(1− μ−B(G(φ∗∗)− μ))
φ∗∗G0(φ∗∗)(1− μ) + 1
i
(φt−1 − φ∗∗). (24)
Proposition 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, the stability around the steady
state of φ∗∗ is ambiguous.
Proof. Because G(φ∗∗)−μ is negative and 1−μ−B(G(φ∗∗)−μ) is positive, the coeﬃcient
of (φt−1 − φ∗∗) in Eq.(24) is less than 1. Note that G0(φ∗∗) is in (0,∞). Therefore, if
G0(.) is suﬃciently large around the neighborhood of the steady state of φ∗∗, the coeﬃcient
of (φt−1 − φ∗∗) is greater than −1, whereas if G0(.) is suﬃciently close to 0 around the
neighborhood of the steady state of φ∗∗, the coeﬃcient of (φt−1−φ∗∗) is smaller than −1. ¤
We note from Proposition 3 and its proof that the stability of the steady state of φ∗∗
depends upon the distribution of Φ. If shocks that aﬀect the parameter values of the dis-
tribution of Φ occur frequently and the configuration of the distribution is changed, the
economy may often lose or restore the stability around the steady state of φ∗∗.
If the steady state of φ∗∗ is unstable, the economy exhibits endogenous business cycles.
If μ is arbitrarily close to zero, limμ→0 φ∗ = 0 because limμ→0G(φ∗) = 0. In this case, from
Assumption 1, we do not have the steady state of φ∗∗, and thus the economy never exhibits
endogenous business cycles. Alternately, if μ is arbitrarily close to one, it follows from the
definition of φ∗∗ that limμ→1 φ∗∗ = h because limμ→1G(φ∗∗) = 1. In this case, assuming that
limμ→1G0(φ∗∗)∂φ∗∗/∂μ is bounded above, we are able to demonstrate, using L’Hospital’s rule,
that the coeﬃcient of (φt−1 − φ∗∗) in Eq.(24) is arbitrarily close to one as μ is arbitrarily
close to one. Again, in this case, the economy never exhibits endogenous business cycles.
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Therefore, it is when the extent of financial market imperfections is at the intermediate level
that the economy experiences endogenous business cycles. This consequence is consistent
with the existing literature (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004; Kunieda and Shibata, 2011).
3.5 Global dynamics: Phase diagram analysis
From Propositions 2 and 3, we find that there are various patterns of the dynamic behavior of
the economy, depending upon the configurations of the functions of Λ(φ) and Ψ(φ). However,
it is impossible to analyze those patterns comprehensively. In this section, we investigate
two typical cases of the dynamic behavior of the economy, using phase diagrams.
We first consider the features of the functions of Λ(φ) and Ψ(φ). We easily obtain
Λ(0) = 0 and Λ(φ∗) = 0. Because Λ0(φ) = [(G(φ)−μ)(F (φ)+φ2G0(φ))+φG0(φ)F (φ)]/F (φ)2,
we obtain:
limφ→0Λ
0(φ) < 0
and
limφ→φ∗ Λ
0(φ) > 0.
Therefore, from the continuity of Λ(φ), there is a minimum value of Λ(φ) in (0,φ∗). Let the
value of φ that gives the minimum value be φ¯. Then, φ¯ satisfies Λ0(φ¯) = 0 or equivalently:
G(φ¯)− μ = −φ¯G
0(φ¯)F (φ¯)
F (φ¯) + φ¯2G0(φ¯) .
From this, we obtain the minimum value of Λ(φ):
Λ(φ¯) = −φ¯
2G0(φ¯)
F (φ¯) + φ¯2G0(φ¯) =:M,
where M ∈ (−1, 0).
On the other hand, it is easily shown that Ψ(φ) is an increasing function. We also know
that Ψ(φ∗) = 0 and
Ψ(0) = −Bμ
1− (1−B)μ ,
where we note that Ψ(0) is decreasing with respect to B and that limB→0Ψ(0) = 0 and
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limB→B∗ Ψ(0) = −B∗μ/[1 − (1 − B∗)μ]< 0. Here, we impose an assumption regarding the
relationship between M and Ψ(0) so that we always obtain equilibrium.
Assumption 2
M ≥ Ψ(0).
Assumption 2 guarantees that any sequence of {φt} that is generated from the dynamical
system (19) with an initial value of φ0 ∈ [0,φ∗] is an equilibrium path. BothM and Ψ(0) are
negative. Therefore, if βe is very small relative to βc, Assumption 2 does not hold because
|Ψ(0)| is very small in such a case.10
[Figure 1 around here]
Figure 1 provides two phase diagrams for two typical cases of the dynamic behavior of
the economy. In both cases, we assume that the initial value of φ0 is close to φ∗. Panel A
provides the case in which the steady state of φ∗∗ is stable. Because φ∗∗ gives the highest
growth rate, as φt decreases from φ0, the growth rate increases and the economy experiences
an economic boom. Eventually, the economy converges to the steady state that gives the
highest growth rate because the steady state of φ∗∗ is stable. Panel B provides the case
in which the steady state of φ∗∗ is unstable. As in the case of Panel A, the growth rate
increases and the economy experiences an economic boom as φt decreases from φ0. However,
because the steady state of φ∗∗ is unstable, φt does not converge to the steady state of φ∗∗.
Accordingly, the economy fluctuates forever, and it may even exhibit a complex dynamic
behavior, depending upon the configurations of Λ(φ) and Ψ(φ).
4 Discussion about a financial crisis
In this section, we discuss a financial crisis accompanied by a credit contraction and followed
by a severe depression, using the current model. Let us suppose that M and Ψ(0) are very
close under Assumption 2. Figure 2 illustrates an equilibrium path of φt that leads to a
financial crisis. As observed in Figure 2, the initial value of φ0 is close to φ∗. As in the
10Meanwhile, there are configurations of Λ(φ) and Ψ(φ) that satisfy Assumption 2 because
limB→B∗ Λ0(φ∗) = limB→B∗ Ψ0(φ∗).
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examples in Figure 1, the growth rate gradually increases and the economy experiences an
economic boom. However, if φt happens to be close to φ¯ in some period, the cutoﬀ φt
(equivalently the interest rate) steeply falls down to a very small value in the next period,
which is close to zero. In the subsequent period, φt suddenly goes up. Because φ∗ deviates
far from φ∗∗ that gives the highest growth rate, if φt happens to be very close to φ∗ when it
suddenly increases, the growth rate suddenly decreases and an economic collapse follows. In
such a case, the economy goes into a severe depression because it takes so much time for φt
to start to increase steadily. Figure 3 illustrates the growth rates that corresponds to each
value of φt in Figure 2.
[Figure 2 around here]
[Figure 3 around here]
While an economic boom is ongoing, φt (or the interest rate) keeps decreasing, as observed
in Figure 3. This decrease occurs because the supply of financial resources by financiers keeps
increasing in the financial market in the process of the economic boom. When φt is relatively
large, the equilibrium interest rate is also large, and the financiers’ net worth thus propagates.
As the financiers’ net worth propagates, the supply of financial resources increases. The
increase in the supply of financial resources exerts downward pressure on the equilibrium
interest rate. While the interest rates continue to decrease during the boom, unproductive
projects are executed by the unproductive entrepreneurs. Because the most productive
entrepreneurs face financial constraints, even increases in investment in the unproductive
projects boost the growth rates during the boom. At the end of the boom, the increase
in the supply of financial resources by the financiers causes a steep fall in the interest rate
in the financial market.11 The net interest rate could even become negative at the end of
11One might argue that there may be another pressure that reduces the equilibrium interest rate. The
burden of repayment facing producing entrepreneurs becomes heavier and heavier as the financiers’ net
worth evolves during the boom. We find from Eqs.(19)-(21) and the function J(φt) that when φt > φ∗∗, the
growth rate of Wt is greater than the growth rate of Yt. This finding implies that the total net worth held
by entrepreneurs is likely to shrink, provided that φt is even larger than φ∗∗. As a result, the demand for
borrowing would decrease because of the financial constraints associated with the entrepreneurs’ net worth.
Although this decreased demand for borrowing may also exert downward pressure on the equilibrium interest
rate, the eﬀect of the decreased demand for borrowing on a steep fall in the interest rate is limited because
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the boom. If a negative net interest rate is achieved, the total net worth held by financiers
shrinks. Then, the supply of financial resources is significantly reduced in the next period
and the equilibrium interest rate significantly rises. As a result, credit contraction occurs
in the financial market and the unproductive investment projects, which induce the high
growth rate during the boom, are not conducted any more. Accordingly, the economy goes
into a severe depression.
Historically, financial markets evolve in the process of economic development. The devel-
opment of financial markets produces the financier class. We have investigated the macroe-
conomic implications of the coexistence of entrepreneurs and financiers. In section 3.3, we
have shown that the coexistence of entrepreneurs and financiers is likely to lead the economy
to the highest growth rate, given a certain extent of financial market imperfections. This
section, however, has clarified that the coexistence of financiers and entrepreneurs is highly
likely to cause a severe depression for some parameter values. These two-side implications of
the coexistence of entrepreneurs and financiers explain why both instability and high growth
are frequently observed in modern economies.
To conclude this section, we present remarks on output distribution in each time period
between the class of entrepreneurs and the class of financiers. From Eqs. (19)-(21) and
Proposition 1, we find that if φt > φ∗∗, the growth rate of Wt is higher than the growth
rate of Yt, whereas if φt < φ∗∗, the growth rate of Wt is smaller than the growth rate of
Yt. Assuming that W0 is smaller than w0,
12 during the boom before a financial crisis, the
net worth inequality between the entrepreneurial class and the financier class shrinks. The
total net worth held by the financier class may even overtake the total net worth held by
the entrepreneurial class before a financial crisis. However, if φt becomes close to zero when
a financial crisis occurs, Wt also becomes close to zero, while Yt remains a certain positive
value that is significantly greater than Wt, which implies that when a financial crisis occurs,
the net worth inequality widens.
φt is close to φ∗∗ at the end of the boom.
12Because we have assumed that φ0 is close to φ∗, the assumption that W0 is smaller than w0 is plausible.
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5 Concluding Remarks
Over the past twenty years, many countries have suﬀered from financial crises followed by
severe economic depressions. However, the reasons why such severe crises occurred repeat-
edly in modern economies remain unclear Is capitalism inherently unstable? Our dynamic
general equilibrium model provides a possible answer to this question, generating endogenous
business cycles and a financial crisis.
Our model has demonstrated that in a financially constrained economy, the coexistence of
entrepreneurs and financiers has a two-fold importance. On the one hand, economic growth
is accelerated and the highest growth rate is achievable only when financiers coexist with en-
trepreneurs. On the other hand, because of the coexistence of financiers and entrepreneurs,
a financial crisis followed by a severe depression is highly likely to occur for some param-
eter values. If a financial market becomes perfect, no financial crises occur in our model.
Therefore, it is important to consider a policy to establish a financial market that is close
to perfection. However, it seems very diﬃcult to enact a complete policy to obtain a perfect
financial market because of the potential agency problems remaining in a financial market.
As such, it is also important to consider a policy to avoid financial crises given a certain
extent of financial market imperfections. This topic is left for future research.
Appendix
Derivation of Eq.(6)
We should note that when making a lending-investment-borrowing decision at time t −
1, an entrepreneur has information about her productivity at time t, which is given by
Φt−1(ωt−1). From Eqs.(4) and (5), the lending-investment-borrowing plan at time t−1 of an
entrepreneur with Φt−1(ωt−1) > φt−1 := rt/A is given such that bt−1(ωt−1) = −μkt−1(ωt−1)
and kt−1(ωt−1) = at−1(ωt−1)/(1− μ). Therefore, her budget constraint at time t is given by
kt(ωt) + bt(ωt) = (AΦt−1(ωt−1)− rtμ)kt−1(ωt−1)− ct(ωt),
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or equivalently,
at(ωt) = AΦt−1(ωt−1)− rtμ
1− μ at−1(ω
t−1)− ct(ωt). (A.1)
Similarly, from Eqs.(4) and (5), the lending-investment-borrowing plan at time t − 1 of
an entrepreneur with Φt−1(ωt−1) < φt−1 := rt/A is given such that bt−1(ωt−1) = at−1(ωt−1)
and kt−1(ωt−1) = 0. Therefore, her budget constraint at time t is given by:
kt(ωt) + bt(ωt) = rtbt−1(ωt−1)− ct(ωt),
or equivalently,
at(ωt) = rtat−1(ωt−1)− ct(ωt). (A.2)
From Eqs.(A.1) and (A.2), the flow budget constraints for τ ≥ t are given by Eq.(6).
Proof of lemma 1
From the flow budget constraint (6), we have:
E
"
at+1(ωt+1)
ct+1(ωt+1)
¯¯¯
Φt(ωt)
#
= at(ωt)E
"
R˜t+1
ct+1(ωt+1)
¯¯¯
Φt(ωt)
#
− 1. (B.1)
Substituting Eq.(7) into Eq.(B.1), we have:
at(ωt)
ct(ωt) = βeE
"
at+1(ωt+1)
ct+1(ωt+1)
¯¯¯
Φt(ωt)
#
+ βe.
From this equation and the law of iterated expectations, we obtain:
at(ωt)
ct(ωt) = β
τ
eE
"
at+τ (ωt+τ )
ct+τ (ωt+τ )
¯¯¯
Φt(ωt)
#
+ βe + β2e + ...+ βτe .
From the transversality condition, we have limτ→∞ βτeE[at+τ (ωt+τ )/ct+τ (ωt+τ )|Φt(ωt)] = 0.
Therefore, at(ωt)/ct(ωt) = βe/(1− βe) for all t ≥ 0 and thus at+1(ωt+1) = βeR˜t+1at(ωt) from
Eq.(6). ¤
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Microfoundations for the credit constraint (2)
Microfoundation I
Following Aghion et al. (1999), Aghion and Banerjee (2005), and Aghion et al. (2005), we
assume that financial market imperfections arise simply from the possibility that borrowers
may not repay their obligations.
Let us consider an entrepreneur who borrows financial resources in the financial market.
The net worth that the entrepreneur prepares for her own investment project is at. If she
borrows −bt in the financial market, her total resources to invest are kt = at − bt at time t.
The return on one unit of investment at time t is AΦt. If the entrepreneur earnestly repays
her obligations, then she will acquire a net income, AΦtkt+rt+1bt at time t+1. Meanwhile, if
the entrepreneur does not repay her obligations, she will incur a cost δkt to hide her revenue.
In this case, the lender monitors the entrepreneur and is able to capture the entrepreneur
with a probability of pt+1. Thus, her expected income is given by AΦtkt − δkt + pt+1rt+1bt.
Under this lending contract, the incentive compatibility constraint for the entrepreneur
not to default on her loan is given by:
AΦtkt + rt+1bt ≥ [AΦt − δ]kt + pt+1rt+1bt, (C1)
or equivalently,
bt ≥ −
δ
rt+1(1− pt+1)
kt, (C2)
The left-hand side of Eq. (C1) represents the revenue that the entrepreneur obtains when
she invests in a project and consistently repays her obligations. The right-hand side is the
gain when she defaults.
To achieve the probability pt+1 to capture a defaulting entrepreneur, the lender incurs
an eﬀort cost, btC(pt+1), which is increasing and convex with respect to pt+1. As in Aghion
and Banerjee (2005), we assume C(pt+1) = κ log(1− pt+1), where κ is strictly greater than δ
so that our study is meaningful.13 The lender can choose an optimal probability by solving
13If δ ≥ κ, no entrepreneurs face binding credit constraints.
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a maximization problem such that:
max
pt+1
− pt+1rt+1bt − κ log(1− pt+1)bt.
Because −bt > 0, this maximization problem is rewritten as:
max
pt+1
pt+1rt+1 + κ log(1− pt+1).
From the first-order condition, we have
rt+1 =
κ
1− pt+1
. (C3)
As the interest rate rt+1 increases, the lender chooses a higher probability to detect a de-
faulting entrepreneur. From Eqs. (C2) and (C3), we obtain:
bt ≥ −
δ
κkt,
or equivalently,
bt ≥ −
δ
κ− δat. (C4)
Because the entrepreneur’s productivity Φt is not observable, the lender does not impose
entrepreneur-specific credit constraints. The lender must know the entrepreneurs’ net worth,
at. As long as the lender imposes a credit constraint given by inequality (C4) on entrepreneurs
who borrow financial resources, no entrepreneurs will default in equilibrium. Because δ < κ,
we can let θ := δ/(κ− δ) ∈ [0,∞), and thus,
bt ≥ −θat,
which is a credit constraint in the main text. δ and κ are associated with a default cost and
a monitoring cost, respectively. θ represents the extent of the credit constraint.
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Microfoundation II
We extend the microfoundation for a credit constraint presented by Antra`s and Caballero
(2009) in a manner suitable for our model. We consider the participation constraint faced
by a lender and the incentive compatibility constraint of entrepreneurs such that they do
not back out of their investment projects.
It is assumed that at the end of time t and after investment has occurred, any entrepreneur
can back out of her investment project at no cost, taking some fraction of her investments,
(1− μ)(at − bt), where 0 < μ < 1, and does not repay her obligations to the lender. In this
case, the entrepreneur will engage in general goods production somewhere in the economy.
If an entrepreneur absconds at the end of time t, the lender can reclaim the remainder of
investments, μ(wt−bt). It is assumed that the lender can relend the remainder of the invest-
ments in the financial market. Thus, when making a financial contract with an entrepreneur,
the lender faces a participation constraint such that:
rt+1μ(at − bt) ≥ −rt+1bt,
or equivalently
bt ≥ −
μ
1− μat.
On the other hand, the incentive compatibility constraint for an entrepreneur not abscond
from her project at the end of time t is given by:
AΦt(at − bt) + rt+1bt ≥ AΦt(1− μ)(at − bt). (C5)
For entrepreneurs with Φt such that rt+1− μAΦt ≤ 0, Eq. (C5) always holds. Therefore, we
focus on entrepreneurs with Φt such that rt+1 − μAΦt > 0. Then, Eq. (C5) is rewritten as:
bt ≥ −
μ
(φt/Φt)− μat. (C6)
Because φt/Φt ≤ 1 in equilibrium, it follows that −μ/((φt/Φt)− μ) ≤ −μ/(1− μ), implying
that Eq.(C6) is redundant. In other words, if the lender imposes a credit constraint bt ≥
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−μat/(1−μ), which is the participation constraint of the lender, entrepreneurs never default.
By letting μ/(1 − μ) := θ, we obtain the credit constraint bt ≥ −θat, as shown in the main
text. As μ, or equivalently θ, increases, it becomes more diﬃcult for the entrepreneurs to
withdraw their investment without repaying their obligations.
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Panel B: Ԅככ is locally unstable. 
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Figure 2: Financial Crisis 
 
 
Ԅ 
Ԅכ ൌ Gିଵሺµሻ Ԅככ
O 
Ψሺ0ሻ
ΨሺԄሻ
ΛሺԄሻ tହ
tସ tଷ
tଶ
tଵ
t଴ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 3: Financial Crisis and Growth rates 
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